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The article discusses the pragmatist view of social institutions which underscores 
that institutions are based on habitual action. That habits can be shared is 
sometimes thought to be a problematic assumption but I argue that sharing is the 
default setting in the case of habits as well. These ideas, which were first presented 
by so-called classical pragmatists, also get support from contemporary research 
related to the postulation of so-called common ground. I also discuss Thorstein 
Veblen’s theory of institutions and some of the empirical implications of the insights 
of pragmatist social theory. 
Pragmatism has experienced a renaissance or a “recovery” (Margolis 2010) in social 
theory in recent years. This is no wonder since the so-called classical pragmatists, 
especially John Dewey and G. H. Mead, outlined a highly original theory of social life. 
One of their main points was to show how a theory of habitualised action improves 
our understanding of social structures. This insight has profound implications for 
the way in which we conceptualise many of the fundamental issues in social theory. 
Sometimes it is argued that habits are of relevance only for individual psychology 
but both Dewey and Mead thought that the intersubjective constitution of human 
agency also guarantees the social nature of many of our habits. The ideas of 
Dewey and Mead, however, often do not go into specifics. To get an insight into 
what a pragmatist theory of social structures would look like, I will present some of 
the arguments made by Thorstein Veblen who, besides being the grandfather of 
institutional economics, is also a representative of pragmatist social theory.
For some, pragmatism indicates a somewhat opportunistic attitude in politics; 
this is probably the most common usage of the word. The political message of 
philosophical pragmatism need not be so bleak, however. For example, a recent book 
on President Barack Obama’s political outlook argues that the “close connection 
between the philosophy of pragmatism and the culture of democratic decision 
making illuminates crucial dimensions of Obama’s thinking” (Kloppenberg 2011, xii). 
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Thus, philosophical pragmatism is usually intimately tied up with an appreciation of 
democratic means for making decisions (Dewey 1927).1 Sometimes pragmatism is 
also taken as a catchphrase for relativist epistemological stances in which “anything 
goes”. According to his critics, the late Richard Rorty did his best to advocate such 
a stance. However, the real novelty and contribution of the pragmatist tradition, 
especially from the perspective of social sciences, has to do with its view of action 
as the context in which all things human take place. Explanations for enduring 
social aspects, such as social structures, should always be related to action (though 
not necessarily reduced to it). In the pragmatist tradition, the relation of action and 
structures comes about through a particular kind of action: habitual action. The 
reproduction of social structures takes place when action is habitualised; that is, 
when we develop dispositions to act in the same manner in familiar environments. 
In what follows, I mainly discuss three interrelated issues: the pragmatist concept 
of habit, how habits come to be shared, and the way in which habitual action can 
be said to be the basis of social institutions.
The context of Pragmatism
The concept of pragmatism has been used in such diverse settings that it can 
cause one to question “whether the label serves any real purpose” (Haack 2004, 
5). Despite this diversity, there are certain philosophical principles shared by many 
(if not most) pragmatists. The philosophical “push” behind pragmatism was a 
realisation that knowledge has no certain foundations but that this was no reason 
for despair. This realisation was originally a reaction against the Cartesian quest 
for solid foundations in a situation of imagined “paper doubt”. This phrase, originally 
used by C. S. Peirce, refers to a situation imagined by Descartes where he 
supposedly questioned all of his beliefs at once. In Peirce’s view, all-encompassing 
doubt is not feasible (nothing good will come out of it) or even possible (one cannot 
doubt all of one’s beliefs). In its place, he postulated that there are real situations of 
uncertainty and one can never be certain that the present beliefs and habits one 
happens to hold rest on solid, infallible foundations. In fact, such foundations do 
not exist because there is always the possibility of encountering novel and changed 
situations, which can cause doubt because our habits and beliefs do not meet the 
changed requirements of those situations. 
Classical pragmatists – Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey and G. H. Mead – were 
first and foremost philosophers, but pragmatist philosophy has something to offer for 
social sciences as well. G. H. Mead and John Dewey are the foremost figures in this 
regard. Mead developed a sophisticated conception of the social nature of selfhood, 
1  See also Misak’s (2000) discussion of the epistemological arguments for democracy offered by 
pragmatists.
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whereas Dewey’s ideas on habitual action and its relation with the environment are 
fruitful. Despite the social science ideas of Mead and Dewey, pragmatism and 
sociology have had an uneasy relationship. Often viewed as purely an American 
enterprise, pragmatism has sometimes been met with a European shrug. However, 
there are famous exceptions. Èmile Durkheim, one of the undisputed fathers of 
sociology, found pragmatism a challenge to the tradition of Western rationalism. 
According to him, the acceptance of “the form of irrationalism represented by 
pragmatism” would mean that “the whole French mind would have to be radically 
changed” (Durkheim 1983, 1). He also argued that pragmatism “claims to explain 
truth psychologically and subjectively” (ibid., 67). Durkheim’s interpretation derived 
from seeing pragmatism as a representative of utilitarian thought; thus, pragmatism 
presumably derives truth from mere psychological satisfaction. This is a crude 
caricature of most forms of pragmatism. As Joas (1993, 59-60) – a major figure 
in the renaissance of pragmatism – argues, “pragmatism is above all a reflection 
on the fact that the subject is embedded in praxis and sociality prior to any form 
of conscious intentionality of action.” Accordingly, our embedding in practical and 
social relations is the main focus here, not explaining truth psychologically. In 
pragmatism, truth is rather about facing up to the problems of action in all of their 
social and material facets. Furthermore, Durkheim characterized pragmatism as a 
monism of action, that is, as a denial of conscious rationality. According to Joas, 
this characterization actually characterises behaviourism rather than pragmatism. 
Indeed, pragmatism has never denied that there is a place for conscious, reflexive 
thought. This place, however, is not to be found outside of action, as I explain in 
the next section. Joas concludes his verdict on Durkheim’s arguments by saying 
that they are based on “the false Cartesian alternative of action as purely physical 
movement versus thought as a purely mental construct” (ibid., 71). 
Habits in Pragmatism
In social theory, the concept of habit can be used to discuss at least two interrelated 
dilemmas: the relationship between volition and action or the relationship between 
action and social structures. The first question is addressed by Erkki Kilpinen 
in this volume and will not be discussed at length here. However, it is worth 
pointing out that, as a general philosophical current, pragmatism stresses the 
practical results of our beliefs. The general lesson of pragmatism is a lesson on 
action theory and the way in which action and rationality present themselves in 
self-correcting situations of doubt. The issue of self-corrective rationality refers 
to reflecting on one’s reactions to environmental stimuli as a way to correct these 
reactions if they lead to problems. As Joas (1993, 19) argues, for pragmatists truth 
“no longer expresses a correct representation of reality in cognition, which can be 
conceived of using the metaphor of a copy; rather, it expresses an increase of the 
power to act in relation to an environment” – which is potentially a source of action 
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problems. This does not mean that the idea of a copy would be lost,  for, as William 
James (1975, 102; emphasis added) argues, “To copy a reality is, indeed, one very 
important way of agreeing with it, but it is far from essential. The essential thing is 
the process of being guided.” Thus, mental imagery is in the business of guiding our 
conduct, not in copying it from some perspective that would be totally independent 
of what we are doing (broadly speaking). To many non-philosophers this issue 
can seem trivial. However, it has far-reaching implications: we encounter the world 
through our bodily experience and not only at the level of language, for example. 
That is why habitual dispositions do much of the explaining in pragmatism. Habits 
are often taken to be mere restrictive factors (e.g., of rational action) but this need 
not be the case because one can also see them as “positive agencies.” “The more 
numerous our habits the wider the field of possible observation and foretelling,” as 
Dewey (2002, 175) argued. This means that habits enable different lines of conduct, 
even lifestyles or “careers,” when habits couple themselves with other habits.
In Dewey’s thought psychology is social and thus habits precede individualized 
beliefs and purposes because human beings are always interacting with their 
social and material environment. For human beings, this environment is indeed 
social in the sense that even the material environment is largely moulded by 
social habits and thus even our relationship with the non-human environment is 
mediated by social and cultural attitudes. If this view is taken to its extreme, it 
can lead to too constructionist a view of culture which argues that the material 
world is only a result of individual or social volition. Such extremes are not called 
for by classical pragmatists. Dewey and Bentley (1949) argued that the concept 
of interaction presupposes independently existing “interactors”, whereas trans-
action (with a hyphen) indicates that, generally speaking, no such independence 
exists between an actor and its environment (see also Lyng & Franks 2002). Thus, 
action, especially in its habitual phase, is usually embedded in its environment. 
However, the relationship goes both ways because active engagement is also a 
factor which partly constitutes our environment.2 Thus, what constitutes a stimulus 
depends on our present and former actions. Habits indicate that circumstances 
are, to some extent, a part of us in our tendencies to act. The concept of habit may 
bring to mind the analogy of an ecological niche. Ecological niches are the result 
of an organism adapting to its objective environment through gradual evolution. 
There is, however, the difference that habits are acquired rather than being innate 
dispositions; they are units by which culture is “inherited”. This does not mean that 
our natural proclivities would always be opposed to acquired ones, but there is still 
a conceptual difference between these forms of inheritance. In addition, cultural 
moulding of our environments is an example of so-called niche construction 
whereby an organism actively moulds its environment.
2  The extent of such constitution through active engagement is a factor which is not constant. 
Thus, in some situations there can be more of such constitution than in others.
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In contemporary terminology, we can say that sensomotoric proclivities are a 
necessary basis even for our thought processes, abstract ones included, as the 
latter utilise, for example, various metaphors that are based on our bodily being 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Thus, neither reason nor perception is free from the 
influence of habits, because both are vehicles for action and only make sense 
as part of action processes. Habits are also the unifying factor behind individual 
acts, as they are generalisations from particular responses. This means that what 
we call character is an interpenetration of different habits. Does this mean that 
we are mere slaves of our habits? Not necessarily. Dewey (2002, 38) argued that 
“since environments overlap, since situations are continuous and those remote 
from one another contain like elements, a continuous modification of habits by 
one another is constantly going on.” It can be possible to achieve an integration 
of various habits, however momentary this integration may be, but it is in no way 
self-evident. Reconciling different action processes – habits – is thus an ongoing 
process. To state the matter in Bourdieusian terminology, if one’s habitus is related 
to incompatible field positions tensions are bound to ensue. Habits can never adapt 
to an environment (or environments) entirely, and therefore there is always the 
chance of conflict between a habit and its “habitat”. This can lead to psychological 
distress – cognitive dissonance – but it also gives us the opportunity to distance 
ourselves from our ingrained habits (or parts of those habits) and thus from the 
social circumstances that we happen to inhabit.
Habits and their overt manifestations are often taken to be the same thing. 
However, such alignment can be problematic because, as Hodgson (2006) argues, 
the implication is that habits cease to exist if no overt activity is visible. Do habits 
simply disappear when they are not manifest? This conclusion would amount to a 
denial of the continuity of action – and continuity of action is what habits are about. 
Thus, habits do not refer to discrete acts but to attitudes or dispositions to act in 
a specific fashion: “The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways 
or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, 
these express a way of behaving” (Dewey 2002, 42). Habits are thus general “policy 
recommendations” rather than individual acts (cf. Joas & Kilpinen 2006). 
The pragmatist description of action does not deny reflexivity its important role 
but it situates it in concrete action situations. This is why it can be called situated 
creativity (an expression used by Joas 1996). One can also argue that creativity 
is a phase of action, albeit a very important one. To use concepts proposed by 
Elder-Vass (2007, 341), one can distinguish between a decision-taking phase and 
an action-implementing phase. Reflexivity is especially, if not exclusively, related 
to the former phase, and thus it is not present at all times. However, I would hasten 
to add that even this decision-taking phase is a process situated within action, not 
something external to it. Therefore, both of these phases are, strictly speaking, 
action-implementing. In reading Dewey, one gets the impression that he sometimes 
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overlooks the role that anticipating the possibilities for action plays in reflection, 
since he tends to emphasize the need for habit-change only when habits are facing 
acute problems. Anticipating problems, and not only waiting for problems to come 
about, surely is a central part of our reflective thought processes. Furthermore, in 
situations of current action problems, the failure of habits does not automatically 
and mechanically lead to novel solutions. Rather, this process is always mediated 
through images of the future consequences of possible action scenarios. And at 
any moment, the attempted resolution can also fail. The term “crisis” can lead one 
to think only of major turning points in life or major societal changes (e.g. disasters, 
wars). Naturally, these major events are included in the category of a crisis, but 
action also encounters obstacles in daily life that are much more mundane. These 
obstacles can involve, for example, disagreements with other actors and ensuing 
negotiations with them, or new work tasks with new responsibilities. If nothing else 
changes, then our “inner environment” poses challenges through the aging and 
inevitable decay of our bodies. Conflicts between habits and their environments 
are always more or less present due also to the multiple stimuli that we encounter. 
These stimuli are not only environmental, but they also originate in the associations 
that our minds formulate.
The idea that we mainly adopt a reflexive attitude in relation to action crises can 
sound too instrumental to those ears not accustomed to using action as their starting 
point. What about daydreaming and mental associations? These phenomena are 
naturally real enough, as anyone who has ever had a sleepless night will testify; how 
to stop oneself from thinking, that is the question! Veblen used the concept of idle 
curiosity to refer to the natural tendency to be interested in what happens around 
us, without necessarily having any instrumental aims. However, pure fantasy will 
not get us very far and thus it has to join hands with our existing habits. Even the 
mental associations of a sleepless night are likely to be a nuisance when some 
non-habitual task is imminent (e.g. problems with a relationship, a demanding 
project). Pragmatism does not present a functionalistic account of structures (more 
on this issue later), but it does imply a somewhat functionalistic account of human 
deliberation: habits are adaptations in relation to the environment, and conscious 
deliberation mainly arises when these adaptations do not work for some reason. 
Owing to this adaptive character, habits are often self-perpetuating once they have 
been constituted. For example, habits affect our perceptual awareness by selecting 
familiar stimuli and this is why one can be immune to stimuli that contradict existing 
habits. Does this lead one to conclude that habits are determinants of action? For 
some purposes such wording might be acceptable but in general one can argue, 
as I mentioned, that habits should be perceived as phases of action rather than 
its determinants. Saying that someone did something as a matter of habit can 
naturally act as an explanation in some specific case. However, there are two 
reasons for cautioning against a view of habits as determinants of action. First, 
pragmatists often emphasize the processual nature of action: action is a process 
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in which habits and deliberations take turns. Second, human beings – and other 
animals, one might add – are always active. Thus, there are no passive states of 
inactivity but rather different kinds of action. According to Shilling (2008, 12), a 
consequence of this active view is that instead of explaining the initiation of action, 
one should focus on “the characteristics of how people act in particular situations.” 
One of the most thorough reviews of the uses of the concept of habit in 
sociology has been presented by Camic (1986). According to his analysis, one 
can distinguish a continuum of different kinds of habits. On the lower levels of this 
continuum, one finds dispositions to perform elementary and specific activities, 
whereas on the upper reaches habit refers to a broader conduct of life or to the 
idea of character (ibid., 1045-1046). Even though Camic (1988, 958) claims that 
Meadian uses of the term lie on the lower levels, not all have agreed. Baldwin 
(1988) argues that pragmatists also think of habits in broader ways. In this broader 
sense, “[c]omplex chains of activity may be based on organized sets of habits” 
(ibid., 955). For example, to state the matter in Meadian parlance, the social 
attitudes of the environment and our associations and responses towards this 
environment can be integrated in a generalised other (cf. Camic’s broad sense 
of habits). This integrated unity is not a matter-of-course but rather something to 
strive for. Even though Baldwin’s assessment that pragmatists also view habits in 
the broader conduct-of-life-perspective is not incorrect, it has to be admitted that 
this perspective is underdeveloped in pragmatist social theory and needs more 
focus in the future.
Camic’s (1986) diagnosis for the loss of “habit” from the tool-kit of sociology 
had to do with a general aversion to behaviourism. There are undoubtedly some 
affinities between behaviourism and pragmatism. Both take seriously the argument 
that action matters and that there are stimuli in our environments. However, these 
thought currents are not the same thing. For pragmatists, stimuli relate to what we 
are doing and have been doing. For example, perceptions are very selective in the 
sense that we often pick out those features of the environment that we expect to 
find. Therefore the relationship between stimuli and reactions is not as mechanical 
as it is for behaviourists. Rather, the “stimulus and response reciprocally affect one 
another” (Cook 2006, 70). Or, as Mead (1925, 270) argued, “The percept is relative 
to the perceiving individual, but relative to his active interest, not relative in the 
sense that its content is a state of his consciousness.” Thus, a justifiable aversion 
to behaviourism is not an argument against pragmatism.
Camic’s discussion of habits, although very informative, lacks a perspective on 
recent developments in sociology. One name that springs to mind is that of Pierre 
Bourdieu – his concept of habitus, after all, comes close to that of habit. Bourdieu 
himself noted that his ideas and those of Dewey have “affinities and convergences 
[which] are quite striking” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 122). Both Bourdieu and 
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pragmatists (especially Mead and Dewey) undoubtedly underscore the way in which 
habitualised action is the key to social reproduction. However, Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus is related to socioeconomic factors, whereas pragmatists discuss issues 
of habituality in general. Analysing power relations, socioeconomic factors and 
social differentiation is certainly one of the main concerns of social theory and 
sociology. Thus, in the sociological context pragmatist ideas could, and should, 
be enriched with notions of power and socioeconomic differences. Nevertheless, 
there is a case to be made for a general discussion of habits as well because not 
all habits are related to socioeconomic divisions. Many of them naturally have such 
a basis, but it should be investigated empirically, and not decided on the level of 
theory, whether this is true in the case of a particular habit.3
Sharing habits?
For social scientists, one of the most interesting questions of the phenomenon of 
habituality is the way in which habits are related to social entities. It is easy to see 
habits as individual phenomena, a part of our action. But if habits are in essence 
related individual action, in what sense can they be shared? Turner (1994) has 
argued that many practice theories are not capable of explaining how practices are 
shared and this same critique can be made in relation to theories of habits. If habit 
is a property of an individual – that is, it is in his or her action – then it surely seems 
somewhat paradoxical to speak of sharing habits. Surely one cannot share one’s 
action: if you and I were to go hiking together, you still would not be walking in my 
shoes! According to Kilpinen (2009, 113), however, this problem only arises if we 
view practices and habits as some sort of baggage or possessions to carry around: 
“Turner’s idea about tradition-cum-habit being something that an individual carries 
with oneself and then transmits – like a father gives an inherited gold watch to his 
son – is not necessarily a defining characteristic of traditions.” Kilpinen argues 
that rather than viewing practices and habits according to the logic of possessive 
individualism (as something we could literally possess) we are better off if we follow 
a so-called participatory notion. Habits need not be exactly the same for everyone 
involved; a “‘working agreement’ about basics is all that is needed” (ibid.). 
Thus, in Kilpinen’s view, habits are shared in that they allow for participation in 
common activities. This does not necessitate that habits be completely identical in 
every detail of their execution. For example, one can say that people are habitually 
predisposed to shake hands with certain kinds of people, with strangers met in 
formal occasions, for example, without necessarily shaking hands with the same 
particular people. In addition to offering an explanation for the way in which habits 
3  For a more thorough discussion of the relationship between the ideas of pragmatists and those 
of Bourdieu, see Ostrow (1990), Aboulafia (1999), Colapietro (2004) and Gronow (2011; ch. 4).
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are shared, such a view has the advantage that it leaves room for individual 
interpretation: it does not make the unconvincing claim that units of cultural 
reproduction – habits – are monolithic and shared by all of those living within a 
certain cultural sphere. Rather than falling for such an essentialist view of culture, 
using the concept of habit points to seeing things in terms of populations: there is 
variation between habits (even related habits) and if they are shared, this is to the 
extent that they encourage participation in common activities. This is somewhat 
tangential but evolutionary biology states that particular individuals belong to the 
same species if they can reproduce and breed offspring.4 Analogously one could 
argue that two people share a habit if they are capable of participating in the same 
action process. 
However, one can still wonder what the mechanism behind sharing habits is 
even if they are shared in such a participatory manner. People certainly participate 
in common activities – but how do we know that these activities are based on 
common habits? One possible answer is that habits are shared in the same manner 
that all things human are shared: through taking the attitudes of others towards our 
common environment. Thus, there are no special mechanisms related particularly 
to sharing habits. And even more importantly, what is shared is not a particular 
action but a disposition to do so. Of the classical pragmatists, G. H. Mead presented 
a theory of intersubjectivity (see Gronow 2008a) or primary sociality (Joas 1996). 
Mead postulated that as children develop psychologically, they gradually learn to 
anticipate the reactions of other people towards their own action. This is what he 
meant by the expression “taking the attitudes of the other towards oneself.” This 
indicates that the sharing of habits is a general social psychological process in 
which one anticipates the attitudes or dispositions (i.e., habits) of others and acts 
accordingly. This anticipation is also closely related to the environments of action, 
which are often manifestations of social institutions. For example, having been to 
a hospital before, one anticipates certain responses from the people encountered 
there and acts as a patient (with other patients) without anyone explicitly advising 
us on the moral career of a patient.
Mead’s ideas on developmental social psychology are undoubtedly fruitful but 
they are somewhat speculative. Contemporary research on similar subjects reveals 
that Mead seems to have been more or less correct in his general assessment of 
the importance of sociality for all things human (see, e.g., Bogdan 2003). A closer 
look at current research also gives a more nuanced picture of the issue because 
Mead’s ideas are quite general and do not go into specifics. If sharing is the issue, 
then one surely has to look at communication – after all, sharing happens through 
things being communicated. One promising line of research has been suggested 
by Michael Tomasello (2008; 2009). He argues that human beings understand 
4  Technically speaking, these offspring should also be able to breed.
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any kind of communicative reference by what they postulate to be its shared, 
intersubjective context. The intersubjective, shared context of communication is a 
default setting for human beings and determines what we take to be the relevance 
of communicative acts; the way in which this happens is by intuitively grasping the 
so-called common ground – what is taken as shared in each situation. The concept 
of common ground can refer to, for example, our common communicative history 
or to some presumed common culture (e.g., when communicators meet abroad 
and are from same country of origin). According to Tomasello, only human beings 
are capable of recursive mind reading (I know that you know that I know etc.), role 
reversal imitation (placing myself in your shoes) and properly sharing attitudes and 
feelings. All of these abilities are a prerequisite for seeing ourselves and others 
from a bird’s eye point of view, which Mead referred to with the concept of the 
generalised other. 
Although Mead had a grasp on this phenomenon of seeing oneself as part of a 
social collective, he did not have much to say on the theme of collective intentions. 
Tomasello argues that such intentions are a necessary corollary of human sociality. 
Thus, he implies that when acting with others one not only recursively reads the 
other’s mind and sees the whole situation from a bird’s eye perspective; in addition, 
so goes Tomasello’s argument, one also feels as if acting according to intentions 
not of one’s own choosing but intentions postulated by “us”. This argument might 
be pushing things a bit too far. Even when sharing habits with others, we do not 
necessarily think of ourselves as sharing explicit collective intentions. More often 
than not it is a case of going with the habitual flow of things rather than explicitly 
formulating such intentions with others.5
So far so good – but what does this have to do with the problem of sharing 
habits? What I am trying to show is that sharing all sorts of things in and through 
on-going participation in communal action is something that human beings do by 
default. Graeber (2011, ch. 5) has gone so far as to argue that human interaction 
is based on the well-known communistic principle “from each according to their 
abilities, to each according to their needs”. This does not mean that we would 
be communists in all of our economic relations (these relations actually are, in 
Graeber’s analysis, often based on reciprocal exchange and hierarchies). It simply 
points to the fact that we often take pleasure in sharing things (information, food etc.) 
without taking any account of the things being shared. This is the case especially 
with family and friends but to a certain extent with other people as well. To return 
to my main argument, we interpret the meaning of social situations by what we 
postulate to be the common ground in each situation. This is how habits are shared 
5  However, there are plenty of examples of people trying to postulate explicit and binding collective 
intentions. For example, just think of social movements and the way in which their representatives 
try to state matters in terms of what “they” want etc. On collective intentions from a somewhat 
controversial philosophical perspective, see Searle (1995).
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as well: by intuitively grasping the common ground and by acting accordingly. 
Therefore there is no dilemma about sharing habits; it is something that happens 
by default. This should not mask the fact that it is no small feat to grasp what 
the common ground happens to be in each case – there often are differing and 
even conflicting interpretations.6 However, what separates habits from some other 
social phenomena is that they get their cue from encountering the same sort of 
action situations repeatedly. Accordingly, habits refer to action in situations where 
doubt and confusion about the common ground are missing by definition. Such a 
perspective does not preclude the fact that there is often plenty of variation between 
habits and situations where habits are in doubt. In general, human communication 
is based on relevance and not on producing exact copies. As habits do not produce 
identical copies of themselves, there is bound to be variation among habits. This 
variation itself can also be the source of social change and novel solutions (cf. 
Feldman & Pentland 2003). In any event, it is a matter of empirical investigation to 
find out to what extent habits are actually shared in each case – but the mechanism 
explaining the sharing of habits is no mystery.
To conclude this section I offer some brief examples of empirical work relying 
on the notion of habit. Routines are probably the most studied aspect in relation 
to habits but they are often approached from a psychological perspective (see, 
e.g., Wood et al. 2002). Identifying habits with routines, however, faces the danger 
of making habits too thing-like. After all, the pragmatist way of using the concept 
emphasizes the processual character of habits and the way in which they interact 
and are intertwined with conscious control. Nevertheless, studying habits as 
routines can be done if it is done with caution and bearing in mind that even routines 
are rarely mindless. For example, Katainen (forthcoming) has studied smoking and 
manual work. She argues that the smoking habits of manual workers is so deeply 
engrained because it gives them a certain sense of autonomy in relation to their 
relatively constrained work. Pragmatism can also draw one’s attention to crises of 
habits in different phases of people’s life-course. For instance, using a Meadian 
framework, Ketokivi (2008) has studied the reorganization of family relationships 
as a biographical crisis. Another, related theme, is to pursue the pragmatist roots 
of ethnomethodology since the latter points out that social order is creatively 
maintained in everyday life (Emirbayer & Maynard 2011). Such research could also 
be combined with research into the importance of the common ground conducted 
in cognitive science (Tomasello 2008). The common ground is, after all, usually 
taken for granted and a phenomenon intertwined with habituality. In addition, the 
relationship between socioeconomic habits (Bourdieu’s concept of habitus) and 
more general habits is a theme that should be studied empirically (see Gronow 
2011, 117-118). 
6  In addition, not everyone is equally capable of grasping the common ground. For example, 
people diagnosed with autism probably have major problems in this regard.
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Social habits as institutionalisation
So far I have mainly discussed the nature of habits in general and the way in 
which they are shared. Next I will argue that shared, social habits are one of the 
keys in understanding the enduring aspects of social reality – that is, institutions. 
To do so, I introduce some of the ideas of Thorstein Veblen, who is the founding 
father of so-called institutional economics.7 Economists who worked in the U.S. 
in the first half of the twentieth century and emphasized the role of institutions are 
often grouped under the label Old Institutionalism. Veblen was the main theoretical 
inspiration behind this school. Besides pragmatism, he was also influenced by 
evolutionary theory and instinct psychology (Hodgson 2004). Veblen was highly 
critical of many presuppositions in economics. His main criticisms had to do with 
the hedonistic conception of the individual, the atomistic conception of society, and 
the presupposing of a false role for causality and teleology in explaining individual 
action and social processes (Kilpinen 2000). These criticisms help us to understand 
Veblen’s own habitual view of institutions.
For many economists, the human being is an inactive being who acts only when 
a negative or a positive stimulus drives him or her to do so (Veblen 2002, 73-74). 
According to Veblen, the problem with this view is not the postulation of wrong 
motives for action, but the supposition that action as such needs any motives at 
all. In line with the pragmatist action theory introduced above, Veblen thought 
that motives for action do not precede action but rather enter the scene in the 
middle of ongoing action processes, or habits. Because of their focus on discrete 
acts, “neoclassical economists do not in fact analyze action” (ibid., 78). Second, 
methodological individualism easily leads to an atomistic conception of society 
whereby society is understood merely as the sum of independent individuals 
(ibid., 139). In contrast to some later sociological ideas (Talcott Parsons being an 
example), the enrichment of neoclassical action theory with the normative context 
is not enough because it leaves the underlying view of action untouched. Third, 
neoclassical economics denies the continuity and teleology of action with the 
argument that every choice situation is a discrete event. Structures or institutions, 
as Veblen called them, however, are cumulative causal processes and do not 
have any teleology in and of themselves. Invisible hands or other such ahistorical 
teleological mechanisms are in fact animistic remnants in Veblen’s discussion.
All of these critiques can be applied to dominant paradigms of contemporary 
economics and also to many sociological frameworks. In Veblen’s own view, 
institutions are always based on habits (Veblen 2002, 77). This is why I label his 
position habitual institutionalism (see Gronow 2008b). Due to the intuitively social 
7  See, for example, the recent collection of Veblen’s writings edited by Camic and Hodgson 
(Veblen 2011).
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nature of human action, institutions are based on established tendencies to act in a 
certain manner in a familiar social environment exhibited by many people. Hodgson 
and Knudsen (2006, 14) have argued that Veblen’s perspective amounts to seeing 
institutions in terms of social evolution. In their view, social evolution is not merely 
analogous to evolution in the natural world but it is of the same kind because it 
shares the same general principles. In this general framework, all complex evolving 
systems exhibit the basic mechanisms of Darwinian evolution –variation, selection 
and heredity – and institutions are thus an example of such systems. 
Institutions are indeed complex and they evolve – sometimes gradually, 
sometimes in an abrupt manner – but one should be careful in using the system 
metaphor. It is by no means self-evident that institutions exhibit properties that 
characterize “proper” systems such as organisms. A cautionary note is in order 
because enthusiasm for systems theories led Talcott Parsons to treat social 
structures as intentional beings that follow clearly defined goals. In addition, the 
validity of the evolutionary perspective can even be questioned as a metaphor 
for institutional development because it is by no means self-evident that the all 
mechanisms of Darwinian evolution have counterparts at the institutional level. 
Variation is exhibited by institutions and one can also imagine processes where 
some institutions are “selected” due to their compatibility with other institutions, 
for example. Hodgson and Knudsen also propose that the mechanism behind 
the hereditary aspect of institutions comes down to learning habits of action 
from other actors. Such learning of habits certainly takes place but Hodgson 
and Knudsen tend not to see that the learning of habits is not a process where 
habits are copied as faithfully as genes. Furthermore, Darwinian hereditary theory 
requires descent from a common ancestor. It surely sounds absurd to argue that 
all habits, or institutions for that matter, would have a common ancestor! However, 
conceptualising institutions in terms of habits does not necessarily imply that one 
would have to use the evolutionary perspective as a framework for institutional 
analysis as well – or, one can use it with caution. For example, mechanisms of path 
dependence and lock-in are certainly to be found both in the worlds of institutions 
and species.
Hodgson’s (2006, 138) definition for institutions says that they are “systems 
of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions.” He 
also emphasises that rules should be understood as dispositions. I would hasten 
to add, however, that if habits are the mechanism through which institutions are 
maintained, then the important issue has to do with dispositions instead of rules. 
Rules are intimately related to dispositions but dispositions can be present without 
proper rules behind them. Of course one can then argue, as Hodgson does, that 
institutions are, at least in principle, codifiable as rules. This is indeed true, but in 
many cases any codification only takes place after established habits have been 
put into question. If one defines institutions through rules, this leads too easily into 
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concluding that institutions do not exist if no associated rules are to be perceived. 
Where would one even look for them in the case of informal institutions? In what 
people do, in their dispositions. Defining institutions through rules would also draw 
a too uniform, rule-like picture of action, since rules take the lead and we follow. 
Instead, at the level of action one should define institutions through dispositions, 
tendencies that are, for the most part, habitual. The habitual is the basic level of 
institutional reproduction – not rules that are related to the discursive aspects of 
institutions. Therefore, in case one cares for exact definitions, the following could 
be said of institutions: institutions are based on established and prevalent social 
dispositions that structure action. It is noteworthy that institutions are not necessarily 
reducible to such dispositions. Institutions also include material (buildings etc.) 
and discursive aspects (codified rules), which are not the same thing as habits. 
However, these other aspects are mere potentialities if no one has a tendency 
to act accordingly. Thus, habits can in some sense be said to be constitutive of 
institutions.
A conciliatory solution would be to say that rather than defining institutions as 
rules, one can argue that they are social dispositions that usually have rule-like 
characteristics. These characteristics can exhibit themselves in actual rules but 
need not do so. Defining institutions with the help of dispositions has the additional 
advantage that it fits well with the pragmatist view which stresses that habits are 
the origin of our social formations (rather than rules and other discursive factors). 
However, I will not object if someone wants to define institutions through rules – if it 
is immediately added that rules refer only to regularities of action. Some regularities 
of social action are “only” habitual dispositions and get a voicing in cases where 
their self-evident character is in doubt. For example, in Western countries there is 
no official rule saying that technical occupations are only for men but it is probably 
mainly due to habitual reasons that men are overrepresented in these professions.
Naturally not all dispositions are related to institutions, but only those are that 
are sufficiently established and exhibit temporal constancy. An institution that is 
completely transformed overnight simply is not the same institution anymore. In 
addition, institution-related dispositions are thus also prevalent; they are social 
ways of responding to environmental cues and not just individual habits. It would 
also be possible to distinguish the origin of institutions and the way in which they are 
maintained once in place. This distinction can be useful for analytic purposes but in 
many cases it can be difficult to discern the exact places and dates of institutional 
origin. The more informal an institution is, the more obscure its origin; it is simply 
what the people in question feel they (and possible their ancestors) have always 
done (although they have not necessarily done so). Shared dispositions are the 
reason why one engages habitually, without thinking twice, in joint activities with 
others. This presents us with a self-reinforcing cycle: sharing a disposition and 
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being proficient in doing something makes it easy to take the habit in question for 
granted. Breaking this cycle leads to unpleasant cognitive dissonance.
Stressing the dispositional and habitual nature of institutions allows one to 
analyse institutional aspects in all cases where the required stability and conformity 
of action is present. Some commentators have argued that such an institutional 
conception is too broad (see Fleetwood 2008). A more narrow definition is certainly 
in order in some cases – but this issue depends on the research question at hand. 
For example, Tomasello (2009, 55, 59) argues that in addition to the physical and 
social worlds also inhabited by other apes, only humans live in an institutional world 
with its “public social norms and the assignment of deontic status to institutional 
roles.” In this context – drawing a distinction between humans and other apes – it 
can be useful to connect institutions with normative issues. Despite these provisos, 
an extensive institutional conception is justified because institutionalisation 
happens to be a – or even the – foundational feature of social reality. This is due to 
the fact that we are not inventing our habits anew all the time; rather, we encounter 
familiar social situations and act as we and others in similar situations have done 
previously.
Conclusion
My intention has been to show that the pragmatist concept of habit has relevance 
for discussions on the nature of social reproduction, or, more specifically, on 
the nature of institutions. Whether habits can be shared is an issue that has 
perplexed some previous commentators. These commentators have shared (no 
pun intended) an implicit notion of what sharing habits means; it has been a notion 
of possessive individualism – habits are shared like things or they are not shared 
at all. These commentators also often presume that we are first and foremost 
individuals doomed to our individual subjectivity. Recent research by Tomasello 
points towards a participatory notion of intersubjectivity, which indicates that acting 
together, and interpreting the action of other people based on the common ground, 
are the default setting of human beings. This setting is also the mechanism for 
sharing habits as dispositions. As Mead and other classical pragmatists argued, 
meaning is about shared action tendencies, and if this is the case with meaning 
in general, then habits are not that much different – they are not a special case 
in need of an explanation as to how their sharing comes about. However, if one 
wants to analyse some specific habit and its diffusion across some population from 
a social network perspective, for example, then it can be useful to enquire into the 
more detailed mechanisms that are responsible for its diffusion.8 
8  Social network research has pointed out that there can be different mechanisms behind the 
diffusion of different kinds of things (Borgatti 2005).
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Pragmatism certainly is not the only relevant perspective out there, nor is it a 
theory of everything. For example, in relation to institutions one can argue that there 
are also regulative (legalistic rules), normative, discursive (see Gronow 2008b) and 
material aspects of institutions. To what extent these other perspectives deserve 
a hearing depends on the research question at hand. One criticism of pragmatism 
has to do with the general nature of its theory of action; for some, it can seem too 
general, even so general as to exemplify the perspective known as philosophical 
anthropology. This criticism has some relevance but it sidesteps the fact that all 
empirical operationalizations have to be made from some theoretical or philosophical 
perspective. Pragmatism offers one such perspective – and it has advantages in 
relation to competing paradigms. One major advantage is that it makes possible a 
dialogue between the social and the natural sciences (Lyng and Franks 2002) as 
it draws our attention to the fact that bodily involvement with and in the world sets 
“transactional limits” (i.e., what can be done) to processes of ideational or discursive 
construction (Franks 2003, 616). After the so-called cultural turn some sociologists 
have seen these limits as more malleable and more arbitrary than they actually are. 
Another, related benefit, has to do with pragmatism’s take on action as constitutive 
of social structures rather than antithetical to them (irrespective of whether one 
wants to conceptualise structures as institutions – as I have done following Veblen 
– or not). It is a particular kind of action, habitual action, in which the seeds of 
structuration inhere. However, more precise definitions of social structures and 
institutions are sometimes called for, especially if one wants to operationalize these 
concepts empirically. 
Furthermore, future research – both empirical and theoretical – should discuss 
the relationship between practice theory and pragmatism. Both underscore the fact 
that action is not in the business of executing attitudes that would exist independently 
of the social and material context. What matters instead are tendencies to act 
in accordance with this very context. From the habit-perspective of pragmatists, 
change in patterns of behaviour (e.g., habits) is often the result of the changes 
taking place in the environment of action. Thus, if one wants to change the habits 
that people happen to have – for example, their habits of consumption in a more 
sustainable direction – then tackling this issue calls for implementing changes 
in the environment of action, in its institutional aspects (which can at any time 
be analytically broken down to people’s habits) and probably often in its material 
aspects as well (which is especially of interest to practice theories). This is not 
to deny the relevance of the material environment of action, but pragmatism – 
unlike practice theory – is especially well suited to conceptualise the way in which 
recurrent, shared dispositions to act in a certain manner (i.e., habits) lead to the 
reproduction of institutional aspects of the environment. These aspects have to be 
taken into account by practice theory as well: materiality – not even technology – 
often does not act in and of itself and practices cannot “recruit” anyone (see Shove 
in this volume) if no one acts accordingly and recurrently. 
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